



# Technical Issues Raised By CyberSecurity Policy

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**January 17, 2001**

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## Outline



- **DOE-wide community policies (directives)**
- **Minimizing the number of Future Poor Policies**
- **Policy can bring clarity to and motivate:**
  - **Protection, Detection, Reaction**
  - **associated technologies**
- **Deliverable for this session:**  
**Identify CyberSecurity technologies motivated by  
Appropriate Policy**
- **Deliverable for this workshop:**  
**identify Technologies motivating DOE R&D**

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## DOE-wide Community Policies



- **Cyber Security Architecture**
- **205.1 Unclassified Computer Security Program**
- **205.2 Foreign National Access to Cyber Systems**
- **205.3 Password Generation**
- **206.1 Electronic Mail Analysis Capability**
- **470.2 Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance**
- **CyberSecurity Performance Compliance checklist**

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## Minimizing the number of Future Poor Policies



**Improved cybersecurity practices, in the context of mission, should result in reduced motivation for half-baked policies, by:**

- **Reducing the overall risk to the enterprise**
- **Eliminating specific weaknesses for which reactive policies are sometimes instituted**
- **Improving ability to demonstrate cost/benefit approaches with agreement on acceptable risks**
- **Demonstrating Success via a joint policy/technology approach**

**(if the above is too optimistic,  
we reaffirm our efforts to achieve valued-added policies,  
but not generate technology to support poor policy)**

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## Guidelines For Good Policy



### Good Policy

- Is Driven by mission
- Is inherent to a prudent cybersecurity program
- Results from identified specific threats/vulnerabilities and a cost/benefit approach to reduce risk
- Is driver for and a partner with Technology
- Is thin but durable, specifying outcomes
- Implementation can be verified
- Is understood, in motivation and implementation, by those who must comply with them

Connecting research funding to DOE needed policies helps motivate/secure funding

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## Policy driving Technology



### Protection:

- Authentication
- Configuration Management
- Firewalls, VPN
- Filtering

### Detection:

- Host Based intrusion detection
- Network Based intrusion detection
- Electronic Mail Analysis Capability

### Response:

- Incident Response
- Activity blocking
- Disaster Planning
- Incident Reporting & Evidence Collection
- Forensics, Secure Auditing

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## **Needed Interactions between policies and technologists**



- 1. Develop Security Models that support widely distributed HPC/HPN**
  - for both open and less-open collaboration
  - within individual sites and across the enterprise
- 2. Design and Build Security into Systems**
- 3. Develop Evaluation Criteria for Cyber Products**
- 4. Develop Metrics of Success for CyberSecurity Programs**
- 5. Develop policies and technologies that consider the human factor**
- 6. Utilize Test Beds**

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## **Open Discussion**



**DOE scientific programs require cybersecurity policies –  
these motivate a Technological response.**

**Some Technologies –  
we can and will just buy and use.**

**Other DOE Requirements motivate DOE R&D, as**

- we need them earlier than general community
- we have unique requirements (HPC, HPN, distributed resources and scientists)
- as good citizens, we must contribute to the Internet community

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